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Abstract 
 
 
 
“There will be no poor people, no beggars, no homeless people.”1 That is Muhammad 
Yunus’ wish list for 2050. Having this target in mind, Muhammad Yunus began 30 years ago 
to develop one of the most important innovations in the world of finances: the concept of 
microcredits.  
 
Dr. Yunus began 1976 by distributing around U.S.$27 worth of loans from his pocket among 
40 extremely poor Bangladeshis and serves nowadays more than six million poor families 
with loans, savings, insurance and other services. The aim is to understand what the concept 
consists of, how it must be used, what added value it brings and above all if it can be 
considered an efficient way to overcome poverty and to provide better options to start new 
businesses to people that are normally excluded from conventional financial services such as 
credits.2 Because of its importance in the fight against poverty, the United Nations dedicated 
an entire year, the International Year of Microcredit 2005, to this concept. Dr. Yunus was 
even awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.  
 
The microfinance industry is characterized by organizations without a view to profit. Latter 
are mostly donation-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They often face 
resource limitations when it comes to satisfy the enormous, increasing demand, which 
hamper growth and further development. To overcome these obstacles, a new trend could be 
observed in the recent years: microfinance institutions (MFIs) decided to transform their 
NGOs into regulated microfinance institutions (RFIs). This form of MFI implicates an 
orientation towards financial targets.  
 
This paper is devoted to the question, if a transformation to a profit-oriented organization 
systematically brings a mission drift, meaning a shifting of priorities along, from its initial 
social mission to the satisfaction of the investors.  
                                                        1 See Yunus (2008) 2 See Orsi (2009) 
 Zusammenfassung 
 
 
 
„Es wird keine armen Menschen, keine Bettler und keine obdachlosen Menschen mehr 
geben.“3 Dies stand auf der Wunschliste von Muhammad Yunus für das Jahr 2050.  Mit 
diesem Ziel vor Augen begann er vor 30 Jahren einer der größten Innovationen im 
Finanzsektor zu entwickeln: das Konzept der Mikrokredite.  
 
Dr.Yunus begann 1976 25U.S.$ unter 40 extrem armen Bangladeschis aufzuteilen. 
Heutzutage kann er sechs Millionen arme Familien zu seinen Kunden zählen denen er mit 
seiner gegründeten Grameen Bank mit Krediten, Einlagen, Versicherungen und anderen 
Dienstleistungen zur Verfügung stellt. Die Herausforderung besteht darin, das Konzept zu 
verstehen und herauszufinden wie man es effizient zur Armutsbekämpfung anwendet, 
nämlich extrem arme Menschen zu adressieren, die normalerweise vom konventionellen 
Finanzsektor und deren Dienstleitungen ausgeschlossen sind.4  
Durch die Wichtigkeit der Mikrokredite in der Armutsbekämpfung widmete die Vereinten 
Nationen ihnen das ganze Jahr 2005. Muhammad Yunus bekam sogar den Friedensnobelpreis 
in 2006. 
 
Im Mikrofinanzsektor überwiegen non-profit Organisationen. Diese sind meistens 
spendenabhängige non-governmental Organisationen, so genannte NGOs. Diese stoßen oft 
und bald an Grenzen bezüglich ihrer Ressourcen wenn es dazu kommt die stark wachsende 
Nachfrage zu befriedigen. Dies wiederum blockiert das Wachstum und weitere 
Entwicklungen der Organisation. Um diese Hindernisse zu überwinden kann man heutzutage 
einen Trend verfolgen: die  Transformation von NGO Mikrofinanzinstitute in regulierte 
Mikrofinanzinstitute.  
 
Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob eine solche Transformation 
systematisch zu einem Abdriften der sozialen Mission führt, da ein reguliertes 
Mikrofinanzinstitut finanzielle Ziele, aufgrund der Forderungen der Investoren, nicht außer 
Acht lasse kann.                                                          3 Vgl. Yunus (2008) 4 Vgl. Orsi (2009) 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1 Introduction 
 
“There will be no poor people, no beggars, no homeless people.”5 That is Muhammad 
Yunus’ wish list for 2050. Having this target in mind, Muhammad Yunus began 30 years ago 
to develop one of the most important innovations in the world of finances: the concept of 
microcredits.  
 
Dr. Yunus began 1976 by distributing around U.S.$27 worth of loans from his pocket among 
40 extremely poor Bangladeshis and serves nowadays more than six million poor families 
with loans, savings, insurance and other services. The aim is to understand what the concept 
consists of, how it must be used, what added value it brings and above all if it can be 
considered an efficient way to overcome poverty and to provide better options to start new 
businesses to people that are normally excluded from conventional financial services such as 
credits.6 Because of its importance in the fight against poverty, the United Nations dedicated 
an entire year, the International Year of Microcredit 2005, to this concept. Dr. Yunus was 
even awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.  
 
The microfinance industry is characterized by organizations without a view to profit. Latter 
are mostly donation-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They often face 
resource limitations when it comes to satisfy the enormous, increasing demand, which 
hamper growth and further development. To overcome these obstacles, a new trend could be 
observed in the recent years: microfinance institutions (MFIs) decided to transform their 
NGOs into regulated microfinance institutions (RFIs). This form of MFI implicates an 
orientation towards financial targets.  
 
This paper is devoted to the question, if a transformation to a profit-oriented organization 
systematically brings a shifting of priorities along, from its initial social mission to the 
satisfaction of the investors. This would be called a mission drift.  
 
 
                                                         5 See Yunus (2008) 6 See Orsi (2009) 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In this paper, I will start by explaining the concept of microfinance, describing the target 
clients and will elaborate on the different services included in the term. After giving this 
introduction, I will define the great macroeconomic impacts coming along with the success 
or failure of microfinance.  
 
In Chapter 2 follows a focus on the financial institutions providing microfinance, the 
microfinance institutions, and how they are established.  
 
The next two Chapters elaborate on the process of the transformation from an NGO to a 
regulated microfinance institution, followed by the chapter where chances and challenges 
involved before, during and after the decision and procedure of transformation are elucidated. 
 
Chapter 8 examines if MFIs could achieve what they were targeting with the regulation, 
based on the data collected in the last years from institutions that went through this process.  
 
The key question is answered by evaluating the most known case of transformation, the NGO 
PRODEM becoming the Banco Solidario, short BancoSol, in 1992.  
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2 Introduction in Microfinance  
2.1 Microfinance  
 
“Poverty is not created by the poor. It is created by the structure of society and the policies 
pursued by society. Change the structure as we are doing in Bangladesh, and you will see 
that the poor change their own lives. Grameen’s experience demonstrates that, given the 
support of financial capital, however small, the poor are fully capable of improving their 
lives.” Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank, Founder.7 
 
Microfinance is a short term of micro financial service and describes small-scale financial 
services such as savings, loans, remittances, insurance or pensions.8  
The targeted clientele is characterised by the heterogeneity of their financial needs. To fulfil 
them, the microfinance institution has to customize services as much as possible and respond 
quickly to changes with a minimum of bureaucratic procedures.    
 
The remarkable achievement of microfinance is that they found systems and methods to lend 
to these households and enterprises without formal employment.  According to Rhyne, those 
techniques are developed around the following key principles, also known as core best 
practices in microfinance: 
 
• Motivating the clients to repay with the promise of continued access to credit, peer pressure, 
loss or personal assets, and other collateral substitutes 
• Following a conservative approach to loan approval and loan size determination based on 
analysis of existing repayment capacity, or stepped lending 
• Having strong management systems, including immediate, personal follow-up, staff 
incentives, and management, and management information systems.9 
 
 
                                                         7 See About Microfinance, 2009, http://www.kiva.org/about/microfinance 8 See Microfinance Information Exchange (2009) 9 See Rhyne (2002), p.5 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2.2 Clients of Microfinance 
 
 
People can be classified into two categories, bankable and unbanked. They are called 
unbanked when they have no chance with their actual economical and social situation to 
access any financial services, such as savings, loans, remittances, insurance or pensions 
through any type of financial sector organization such as banks, non-bank financial 
institutions, financial cooperatives and credit unions, finance companies and NGOs. Banked 
people have access to financial services through their economical activeness, which can lead 
to income generation, repayment of loans, savings and the building of assets.10  
 
“The great challenge before us is to address the constraints that exclude people from full 
participation in the financial sector… Together, we can and must build inclusive financial 
sectors that help people improve their lives.” Kofi Annan, UN secretary General. 
 
The main characteristics of the targeted clientele are that they are very poor, often not even 
able to provide a loan security and mostly living in remote areas. The conventional banks 
therefore consider this segment as unbankable due to the lack of collateral, tangible security. 
Neither can they borrow against their future income due to the tendency no to have steady 
jobs or income streams that can be tracked. Microfinance clients often speak a local dialect, 
which complicates the communication and leads to asymmetric information between clients 
and institutions. They are also often living far away or in the urban slums so that it would 
take too long to visit their businesses. The result is that the payout for the financial institution 
would be inefficient due to the small amounts and the relative high transaction costs.  
 
Microfinance makes unbanked people bankable. Its systems, tools and services to enable it 
are discussed subsequently. 
Women make up a majority of microfinance clients, in some instances even 100%. 
Considering the total of the microfinance clientele, 33% are men. The clients operate small 
businesses, such as fishing, small shops or transportation, often owned by them, enabled by 
microcredits.11 
                                                        10 See International Year of Microcredit 2005 (2009), 11 See Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, (2009) 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2.3 Microcredit  
 
A microcredit is a small amount of money loaned by a bank or other institution, generally for 
a productive purpose. Further characteristics are the short-term lending periods and the in-
depth client relation.  
 
2.3.1 Strategy of Granting Microcredits  
 
The question we have to ask us is, why the repayment rate of microcredits is higher than the 
one of the conventional credits. Microfinance clients are excellent credit risks. Even without 
security deposit, the repayment rate is between 95 and 98 percent, higher than the one of 
student loans or credit card debts in the United States.12 
 
Because of the lack of security provided by the clients, microfinance lenders had to develop 
other incentives for the amortisation of debts. Two methods are applied predominantly: group 
and individual microcredit. The difference is that the credit is lent to a single person or to a 
group of mostly five people as a unit.  
   
2.3.2 Individual Credit 
 
The characteristics of individual lending include the guarantee of loans by some form of 
collateral or a co-signer, a person who agrees to be legally responsible for the repayment of 
the loan.13 Lenders of individual credits need to be innovative to find incentives that could 
guarantee repayments. The standardized contracts of credits differ in every institution, but 
following are some effective incentives:  
 
• Contracts terms and conditions can be gradually improved with each new loan as 
borrowers show their willingness to repay and their capacity 
• The promise of future access to other services, encouraging the development of a long 
term relationship between the lender and borrower 
• The use of direct or delegated strict monitoring of repayment behaviour 
                                                        12 See Grameen Foundation (2009) 13 See Ledgerwood, (2002), p. 68 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• Seizing of assets if existent14 
 
2.3.3 Group Credit 
 
The group credit is characterised by joint liability, meaning that each member is liable for the 
repayment of the loan and has to repay the total of the outstanding amount in case another 
member does not repay. Thus, borrowers have a limited liability constraint, meaning that the 
total dues to the bank cannot exceed the total revenues gained from the project they invested 
in with the microloan. In case the project fails, group members don’t owe the institution 
anything.15  
Showcases for this group-lending model would be the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and 
ACCION International’s solidarity group lending. They form relatively small group of 5 to 
10 people and give individual credits to the members. The Foundation for International 
Community Assistance (FINCA) use the village banking model, where they form larger 
groups between 30 and 100 people. The microcredit is given to the group itself, rather than to 
individuals. A clear advantage of this model is that certain institutional transaction costs can 
be reduced by shifting the screening and monitoring to the group. Self-selection of new group 
members is very important as people of the same community have normally good knowledge 
about how reliable other members are.  Groups are very careful about whom they let in, 
given the joint liability. Thus, the MFI is able to reach a larger number of clients, as 
transaction costs and effort are proportionally smaller considering the number of 
individuals.16 
In the case of group lending, the created social pressure within the group substitutes the 
collateral and the joint liability is an incentive for the repayment of the partial loan. 
 
Two problems can occur within a group, the mismatching and domino effect. The matching 
problem happens when a members who originally agreed to the same terms and conditions, 
evolve financially and have different financial needs as time passes during a loan cycle. 
Different economical targets require diverse preferences concerning conditions of repayment 
or credit volume. Members needing only a smaller amount of loan could refuse to accept the 
joint liability for higher amounts.17                                                          14See Rodríguez‐ Meza, (2000), S.11 15 See Andersen and Nina, 1998 16 See Ledgerwood, (2002), pp. 69‐70 17 See Paxton (1996), p.49 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A second negative facet within the group could be the domino effect caused by members 
deciding not to repay they part of the loan if others default, even if sufficient income exists. 
Thus blocking the ability to endanger the entire group’s future access to credits. The loan 
default rate rises because “good” borrowers make the decision not to repay because of the 
financial failure of others.18 
 
Examples of Categories of Microloans: 
• Philippines: maximum amount of microcredits is approximately U.S.$2,700 
• Colombia: microcredits are given to microenterprises with fewer than ten employees and 
total assets below 501 times monthly minimum wages (approximately U.S.$115.60 in 
2003). The amount of the credit to such microenterprise shall not exceed 25 times 
monthly minimum wages (U.S.$2,890 in 2003) 
• Peru: microcredits are loans given to microenterprises with a volume of assets (excluding 
fixed assets) below U.S.$20,000 and accumulated debts below U.S.$20,000.19 
 
2.4 Microsaving 
 
 
Micro saving is the division of microfinance that enables people and families with very low-
income levels to save money in accounts for eventual unforeseen expenses, future 
investments and education. It has always been a controversial issue, but statistics have proven 
by now that low-income clients can and do save. Statistical analysis of surveyed institutions 
state though that the mobilization of deposits depends very much on the macroeconomic and 
legal environment and has as an example the following connections:   
 
• A positive correlation with the average growth in per capita GNP of the country 
• A negative correlation with high levels of inflation 
• A positive correlation with high levels of population density 
 
This service does not require a minimum balance and is therefore designed for small amounts 
of money. Account users are not charged for this service. The provision of this service offers 
a stable source of funds for the MFI. It can be voluntary or compulsory to clients.                                                          18 See Paxton (1996), p.48 19 See Ledgerwood (2006), p. 31 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Compulsory savings are more part of a loan product rather than an actual financial product. 
Borrowers as a condition of receiving a loan must contribute them a percentage of the loan or 
a nominal amount. Compulsory savings can be a disincentive to clients, as a withdrawal is 
usually forbidden while a loan is outstanding. For the MFI this kind of saving acts as a form 
of collateral and enables them to help clients to build up their asset base in a debatable 
manner. 
Voluntary savings are independent to any loan product and not mandatory to access credit 
services. Interest rates offered range between very low percentages and slightly higher than 
the rates given by conventional institutions.20 For a MFI to consider mobilizing voluntary 
savings successfully, several conditions have to be fulfilled.  
First of all, the macroeconomic and financial sector environments need certain stability. It is 
difficult convincing the poor to save money during turbulent times in politics and high annual 
inflation rates. People tend to hedge with nonfinancial assets against instability. Secondly, on 
the next level, the MFI needs an adequate and effective capability for supervision to provide 
security of the deposits and to protect clients. Government-owned banks have a clear 
advantage over private-owned institutions, as it is more likely to be rescued in difficult times. 
This implicit guarantee provides clients’ confidence in the deposit facilities of these 
institutions. MFIs offering a saving service require an appropriate management of liquidity in 
case of unexpected rising of withdrawal.21 
To make the act of saving as simple as possible, clients need to have bureaucratically easy 
access to their deposits and a geographically easy access to the MFI.  
 
2.5 Remittance 
 
 
Remittances in microfinance are small amounts of money, sent around the world with the 
help of technology. The clients drawing in this service are mostly immigrants sending 
earnings to families in their countries of origin. A second significant clientele are the 
domestic remittances, between urban and rural areas. A positive correlation has been 
observed with increased savings rates. Remittances help to channel the funds towards 
productive uses like education and health of children and therefore leverage their economic 
impact. They play a very important economic role in countries like India and China. 22 The                                                         20 See Ledgerwood (2002) 21 See CGAP (1998)  22 See Remittances Products (2007) 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most outstanding example is probably ACLEDA (Association of Cambodian Local 
Economic Development Agencies), which transferred about $7 million in 2001, $28 million 
in 2002 and increased to $68 million in 2003.23  
2.6 Microinsurance  
 
The concept of the microinsurance is the same as for conventional insurances, with the 
difference that it is again designed for the needs of very poor clients. It is a nascent industry. 
Microinsurance includes for example life, health, accidental death or disability, so that losses 
due to natural disasters, fire or death of a family member cannot endanger the economical 
existence at one stroke. To fulfil the needs of the poor, the terms and conditions are kept 
simple and clear, the premium payments are kept to a minimum, and exclusions and 
requirements such as medical examinations are avoided to the maximum extend possible. 24 
Clients of the Grameen Bank, for example, need to contribute 1% of the credit to an 
insurance fund. In case of death of the client, this fund is firstly used to cover the outstanding 
loan of the deceased client and secondly to provide his family with the means to cover burial 
costs.25  
 
3 Impact of Microfinance 
 
 
3.1 Fighting Against Poverty  
 
“Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger” is the first out of eight goals of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), drawn from the actions and targets contained in the 
Millennium Declaration that was adopted by 189 nations and signed by 147 heads of state 
and governments during the UN Millennium Summit in 2000. The MDGs are to be achieved 
by 2015 and respond to the main development challenges in the world.26  
  
                                                        23 See Fernando (2004), S.7 24 See Microinsurance Products, (2007) 25 See Ledgerwood (2002) 26 See United Nations Development Program (2009) 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The World Bank defines poverty as a lack of resources or ability needed to cover the basic 
needs on an individual or household level.27 According to Latifee, more than 1.2 billion 
people are living at the margins of human being, under one dollar a day.28 Microfinance, 
especially microcredit, is a very powerful tool to fight this problem.   
 
Johnson and Rogaly consider powerlessness as a further dimension of poverty. It is not only 
the low levels of annual income per person, but also the economic inequalities. This can 
occur on different levels: between and within households, as a result of differences in age and 
gender or between communities or social groups, as a result of caste, ethnicity and wealth. 
Defining poverty in terms of social power, gives the MFI the challenge to not only offer 
financial services to the poor in general, but especially to the poor, who are normally 
excluded from such, due to social inequalities.29  
 
3.2 Empowerment of Women 
 
 
The World Bank defines empowerment as “process of increasing the capacity of individuals 
or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and 
outcomes.”30 
Since the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, where women’s access to 
credit has been put on the international agenda, the number of women having access to 
microfinance has increased steadily.  According to the United Nations, the number of women 
receiving microcredits had more than doubled to 10.3 million poor, and increased rapidly to 
69 million by 2005. This last number would represent 84% of the total number of poor 
having access to microfinance.31  
According to Bayes, microfinance, especially loans, can help women in three different ways. 
Firstly, a microcredit enables women to manage an independent source of income outside 
home, which reduces economic dependency on husbands and help foster their autonomy.  
Secondly, with their own source of income, comes the exposure to new sets of ideas, values 
and social support, which makes them more assertive of their social, political and legal rights.                                                         27 See The World Bank (2009) 28 See Latifee (2003) 29 See Johnson et al.(1997) 30 See The World Bank, (2009) 31 See General Assembly of the United Nations (2007) 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And finally, by having the control over material resources, women’s prestige and status in the 
eyes of husbands and society should raise and gain on importance.32 
 
Grameen Bank has a special focus on enabling access to microcredits to women. Muhammad 
Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank, said at a US Congressional Forum “women have plans for 
themselves, for their children, about their home, the meals. They have a vision. A Man wants 
to enjoy himself” to justify the fact that 94% of his loans go to women.  Statistics show that 
women proved not only to be reliable borrowers but also astute entrepreneurs.  
 
3.3 Wages  
 
In Theory, microfinance can pull a significant number of people out of the rural labour 
market by creating self-employment. Families borrowing microcredit could theoretically get 
a double improvement with the women’s profit from the entrepreneurship and the wages of 
the men increase at the same time. There are only a few empirical evidences for this effect 
though. Khandker, economist in the World Bank Institute for Poverty Reduction, could only 
prove that the Grameen Bank raised rural wages. This effect is feasible and testable, but more 
effort has to be made to control differences in characteristics between villages.33  
 
3.4 Nutrition  
 
Loans given to women had a significant impact on the health situation of their children, as 
the study “Credit Programs for the Poor and the Health Status of Children in Rural 
Bangladesh” by Pitt, Khandker, Chowdhury and Millimet. According to the study, women’s 
borrowing had very positive effect on children’s height and arm circumference, while the 
effect of credits to men on children’s heath were insignificant or even negative.34 
 
 
 
                                                         32 See Bayes (2009) 33 See Goldberg (2005), p.39 34 See Goldberg (2005), p.40 
  12 
3.5 Education  
 
Nowadays, it is well known that children’s education, especially for girls, is one of the 
crucial ingredients for a country’s economic growth and its social development. The UN 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) stipulate that all children, independent of their 
gender, should be able to complete a full course of primary schooling by the year 2015.  
Microfinance plays an important role in achieving this goal. Households with access to 
microfinance came off much better concerning children’s education than other compared 
groups. Khandker came to the result that an increase about 1% of the women’s credit at the 
Grameen Bank, raises the probability about 1.9% that girls are sent to school and even about 
2.4% for boys. Is the credit given to men, the probability that boys are sent to school raises 
about 2.8%, while there is no effect on girl’s education.35 
 
4 Microfinance Institutions 
 
 
4.1 Definition of Microfinance Institutions 
 
 
A microfinance institution (MFI) is an organization providing financial services, especially 
tailored to fulfil the needs of the poor. Clients are in general too poor to be able to access 
services from conventional institutions.36 Thus, MFIs also have in addition to the financial 
objective a developmental or social objective (the macroeconomic impact has already been 
discussed above). If you would ask managers of MFIs which of the two is the key objective, 
they would say the social one.  
Among the first organizations lending money to poor without getting guarantees in return 
was Opportunity International, an NGO with Christian origin, which began to lend in 1973 in 
Columbia. The non-profit organization ACCION International in Brazil followed in the year 
1973 and began to deal with microcredits. The Grameen Bank began in 1976 and soon 
became famous for the credit-lending model, primarily targeted at poor women in small 
groups.  
                                                        35 See Khandker (2003), p.49 36 See International Year of Microcredit 2005, (2006) 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Since everybody assumed that poor people couldn’t save money, organizations initially 
focused on providing loans. Only after the transformation of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
(BRI) from a state-controlled bank in a bank for poor, a bank offered for the first time, 
additionally to the credits, state-guaranteed saving accounts without minimum deposit.37 
 
Details about the exact number of currently established MFIs vary strongly. Forbes is saying 
there are upward of 12.000 issuing loans worldwide38, while the MIXMarket (Microfinance 
Information Platform) has only 1.400 institutions listed.39 
Because of the large range of different types of institutions, it is difficult to make a general 
statement about the special characteristics of MFIs. Based on the following five indicators of 
Staschen, it can be demonstrated that they still differ from traditional financial institutions: 
characteristics of their clients, credit technology, characteristics of the loans, culture and 
ideology, and institutional structure.40  
                                                        37 See The Economist (2005), p.2 38 See Swibel (2007) 39 See The MIXMarket (2009) 40 See Staschen (1999) 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Table 1: Special Characteristics of Microfinance Institutions, Staschen (1999) 
Source: Staschen (1999) 
 
 
According to Greuning et al., there are three rough categories of MFIs that can be categorized 
by the structure of the liability side of their balance.  
Category A includes those using “other people’s money” for funding their credit business. 
These are mostly allowances and concessional loans from donors. These MFIs are also called 
credit-only institutions. Category A include three types of non-profit NGOs: 
 
• Using grants and donations to provide microcredits 
• Augmenting grants and donations with members’ savings and limited borrowings from 
commercial banks 
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• Changing their organizational format into incorporate entities and exercising some 
leverage by mobilizing some “wholesale” funds through wholesale deposits, commercial 
paper or bank credit lines.41 
 
In category B, the member’s money is exclusively used to lend money to members. This 
category consists of membership-based credit unions and savings and credit cooperative 
associations. Examples for this kind of MFI are RoSCAs and Credit Unions.42   
Category C consists of all MFIs using the public’s money to fund their credit business, fully 
developed financial intermediaries.43 This category also consists of three different types: 
 
• Corporate entities authorized to operate as specialized banks or finance companies 
• Licensed banks with mutual ownership of capital by members 
• Licensed regular banks with equity capital owned by individual investors.44 
 
Another type of MFI is a formal bank with a microfinance section. Concerning the 
microfinance portfolio, the banking legislation for regulations is automatically applied, which 
does not meet the requirements of microfinance. This is still an unsolved problem.45  
 
 
4.2 Minimalist and Integrated Approaches to Microfinance 
 
Joanna Ledgerwood describes two types of Microfinance Institutions, the minimalist and 
integrated, both illustrated in the following figure.  
 
                                                        41 See Van Greuning (1998), p.4 42 See Van Greuning (1998), p.6 43 See Van Greuning (1998), p.6 44 See Van Greuning (1998), p.6 45 See Staschen (1999) 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Figure 1: Minimalist and Integrated Approaches to Microfinance  
Source: Ledgerwood (1999) 
 
MFIs using the minimalist approach just offer financial intermediations, occasionally limited 
social intermediation services too. These institutions base their offers on the assumption that 
there is only a single “missing piece”. This piece is considered to be the lack of accessible 
and affordable short-term loans.  
MFIs using the integrated approach go further than just the financial need of the client and 
offer social intermediation, enterprise development and social services, even though 
providing financial services stays the primary role of MFIs. In this paper, only financial 
services will be discussed. 46 
 
 
 
 
                                                         46 See Ledgerwood (2002), pp.65‐66 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4.3 Establishing MFIs  
 
Due to the history the development of microfinance, non-profit organizations (NPO) are the 
most common form of MFIs. Many MFIs have their origin in aid programs, generally 
initiated and supported by non-governmental organizations (NGO).  
In the debate over the statute of the MFIs, GTZ distinguishes between four different 
strategies of formation47: 
 
• Downscaling: a formal financial institution offers products and services to poorer 
population by changing processes in its organization, e.g. by creating or transforming 
special departments for microfinance.   
 
• Upgrading: NGOs can gain important market share through institutional growth and by 
upgrading them to commercial microfinance service providers.  
 
• Linkage: this strategy is linking formal banks with self-help groups. Is has contributed to a 
significant deepening of the financial sector and enhanced territorial coverage.  
 
• Greenfield banking: establishing microfinance institutions from scratch.  
 
The strategies of upgrading, downscaling and linkage make it difficult to separate the formal 
financial sector from the unregulated microfinance sector.48  
 
All MFIs created by upgrading method are subject to the state regulation and therefore need a 
concession from the competent supervisory authority to transact business.49 They can operate 
as good as formal financial institutions and even outperform them in both the range and 
quality of their products and services and geographical coverage. As an obstacle to the 
growth and to assure the survival of these institutions, their charitable nature has been 
proved. They have a lack of real owners, making sure inserted capital is used efficiently, that 
means cost recovery and making profit, to secure sustainability.  
 
                                                        47 See Schliwa (2004) 48 See Staschen (1999) 49 See Ledgerwood (1999), p.12 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Downscaling enhances the geographical coverage of microfinance business. The challenge of 
this strategy is to convince Stakeholder of formal banks of the microfinance sector. 50 These 
projects shown to be successful in transition countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
like the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, where financial markets are developing rapidly and many 
new small businesses are looking for funding.51 
 
Financial intermediaries established by the Greenfield banking method usually have the legal 
form of a corporation and own a banking license from the beginning.52  
 
In 2007, Forbes created a list of the World’s top 50 microfinance institutions, chosen from a 
field of 641 microcredit providers. Every institution must have made available their audited 
financials and must have passed review by a Forbes panel of advisor. The detailed list is 
located in the appendix. This list gives the rank based on: 
 
• Size of their gross loan portfolio 
• Efficiency, which considers operating expense and the cost per borrower as a percent of 
the gross national income per capita of their country of operation 
• Risk, which looks at the quality of their loan portfolios, measured as the percent of the 
portfolio at risk greater than 30 days  
• Return, which is measured as a combination of return on equity and return on assets. 
 
Each category is equally weighted for an institution's overall ranking.53 
The comparison of the following two rankings is of interest. Based on the highest numbers of 
clients being compared with their gross loan portfolio, it shows that the placement varies 
completely. This change is due to the different average loan balance per borrower, shown is 
the table 4 below.  
The MFI with the highest number of active clients was the Grameen Bank with 6.707.000 
borrowers, while the MFI with the highest gross loan portfolio was the BRI, with 
3.035.685.400 US$ in 2006. Meanwhile, the average loan balance per borrower was 555 US$ 
at BRI and only 77 US$ at the Grameen Bank in the year 2006.  
                                                         50 See Schliwa (2004), p.5 51 See Terberger (2002) 52 See Terberger, (2002) 53 See Swibel, (2007) 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Table 2: MFIs with the Highest Number of Clients 
Source: on the basis of The MIXMarket (2009) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Loan Portfolio of MFIs 
Source: on the basis of The MIXMarket (2009) 
 
 
Table 4: Average Loan Balance per Borrower 
Source: on the basis of The MIXMarket (2009) 
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Despite high interest rates most MFIs cannot manage their internal financing. A few 
institutions actually achieve profit. The majority could not survive without ongoing donations 
or are dependent on subsidies in the form of more favourable refinancing through donated 
equity or low interest rates. Instead of striving for profits, MFIs often go for sustainability. In 
this context, sustainability is an important concept and can be defined as follows: 
developments that meet present needs without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their needs.54 This means for financial institutions that they survive by generating 
income and not using their substance.  
However, capital is mostly provided by donations. The Consultative Group to Assist Poor 
(CGAP), a Wold Bank related consortium of multilateral, bilateral and private donors has 
indicated that they pour between half and one billion US$ a year in MFIs, in the form of 
grants and soft loans.55 Significant amounts also come from private donors, which provide 
the institutions large numbers of capital at low costs. But given the growing importance of 
the sector and the exploding demand for microfinance, the requirements of capital often 
exceed the resources of capital provided by donors. 
 
Thus, more and more microfinance institutions come to the conclusion that profit-orientation 
is the best way to reach the mass-market of poor people. An economical self-supporting 
organization that is able to generate profit has access to sufficient capital at reasonable costs 
to be able to transform microfinance from an interesting niche product into a financial service 
with the desired scope and importance.  
 
4.4 Résumé 
 
In the previous chapter we had an introduction to the topic microfinance and its institutions. 
We saw that microcredits are not the only important financial service offered by the 
microfinance institutions, but also insurances, remittances and the savings. They don’t just 
differ strongly from services offered by formal institutions to bankable people but also 
among each other, in terms of the providing organization, conditions or the use of the 
services. The common characteristic of the microfinance services is that they are tailored to 
                                                        54 See WECD (1987) 55 See CGAP (2005) 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fulfil the needs of the very poor people, precisely negotiating with very small, undefined 
amounts of money.  
We also discussed what macroeconomic impact microfinance has on the clients in the 
developing world. Their general goal is to fight against poverty. Alongside, but whose 
importance is not to be undervalued, microfinance is empowering women, enhancing 
education and simplifying the access to nutrition and health. The most well-known 
microcredit model is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, founded by Muhammad Yunus, 
having a special focus on women, providing them access to financial services.  
 
5 Transformation 
 
5.1 Transformation  
 
Most informal and semiformal organizations offering financial services are not subject of the 
governmental regulations that are applied to other financial institutions such as banks. Some 
non-banks such as NGOs operate on the fringe of existing regulations, especially with regard 
to deposit mobilization, which is in sometimes tolerated by the government due to political 
reasons or simply because they do not have enough capacity or time to deal with it. Another 
method to dodge governmental restriction concerning deposit mobilization is simply to call it 
something else.56 
 
While in the past most MFIs worked as NGOs or government-sponsored programs, a trend 
towards the transformation into regulated financial institutions (RFI) can be observed. NGOs 
are normally private, non-profit organizations, pursuing objectives such as poverty reduction, 
development or protection of the oppressed. They are characterized by their financial, 
organizational and legal independence of Governments and authorities. RFI are, on the other 
side, state-licensed financial intermediaries, which are subject to the supervision of the 
Central Bank of the supreme regulator of the country. An individual or group of NGOs, 
transferring their loan portfolio entirely or partially to the RFI, defines the transformation.57 
 
                                                        56 See Ledgerwood (1999), p. 20 57 See Fernando (2004). p.1
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More precisely, transformation in the microfinance industry generally refers to “the 
institutional process whereby an NGO microfinance provider or a microfinance project 
creates or converts into a share-capital company and becomes licensed as a regulated 
financial institution”58. This may involves becoming a license for taking deposits or just to be 
a credit institution.  
 
According to Fernando, this idea started with the transformation of the Bolivian PRODEM 
(Fundación para la Promoción y el Desarrollo de la Microempresa) into BancoSol in 1992 
and he further refers to at least 39 other microfinance NGOs converted to RFIs in the years 
1992 to 2003, most of them located in Latin America and Asia. The transformation to 
BancoSol was decided based on the assumption that PRODEMs NGO status could inhibit the 
continued sustainable growth due to the restricted access to funds on the financial market.59 
 
5.2 Is There a Need to Regulate MFIs? 
 
 
When looking at banking laws, banking business usually “consists of receiving funds from 
the public by accepting deposits or borrowing from the general public and using such funds 
for loans and investments at the risk of the institution conducting the business.”60 In most 
countries, taking deposits from the public is only allowed to formally specially licensed 
financial institutions. The expression “public” is used in banking law when speaking of 
persons beyond a specific number who are not related to each other by law or association. 
Furthermore, the name “bank” is reserved to entities that are legally organized or licensed as 
such and lending to public is subject to prior registration with a supervisory authority. As 
mandatory saving schemes for clients are tied to borrowers credit contracts, non-bank MFIs 
do not provide bank-type savings services. They are therefore not allowed to leverage its 
capital by accepting retail deposits from the public.61 
 
 
 
                                                        58 See Fernando (2004), p.1 59 See Fernando (2004), p.1 60 See Van Greuning (1998), p.10 61 See Van Greuning (1998), p.10 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6 Regulation 
 
 
This chapter looks at internal and external requirements of transformation. Another focus is 
the analysis of additional requirements and contents as a result of transformation. The most 
difficult challenge is the economic aspects as former NGOs struggle with the realisation. RFIs 
come across these struggles because of the regulation and supervision of controlling 
institutions, requirements of investors, and the implementation of internal management, 
controlling and supervisory systems and the installation of a risk management. 
 
The success of MFI transformations is dependent on an appropriate and enabling regulatory 
and supervisory environment. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) defines 
regulation as the “binding rules governing the conduct of legal entities and individuals, 
whether they are adopted by a legislative body (law) or an executive body (regulations)” and 
supervision as the “external oversight aimed at determining and enforcing compliance with 
regulation”62 (CGAP 2003, p.6)   
Before the authorities in charge are able to regulate a MFI, the internal structure requires a 
certain level of self-regulation too. Another approach is therefore the internal regulation 
through governance.  
 
6.1 Internal Regulation  
 
Tasks of the governance are to ensure that no party within an MFI hinders the attainment of 
corporate objectives by diverting its resources or makes decisions for private gain. It is a 
system holding together shareholders, members or donors and the board of directors or 
trustees, executive management, the staff, the clients and the general public. To avoid 
conflicts of interests, the loyalties of management and the board should not only consist of 
shareholders or donors, but also of depositors or other sources of funds that provide the 
leverage to institutional capital.  
When a MIF decides to regulate and therefore to grow, they must adapt their management 
and internal control systems to the different risk profiles and management’s changing needs 
for information to supervise these risks.   
                                                         62 See Christen et al (2003), p.6 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6.2 External Regulation  
 
 
The regulating authorities such as bank supervisors, deposit insurance companies and 
securities regulators become involved in the external risk management process for regulated 
MFIs because of the compelling interest of the government in the soundness and stability of 
the banking and financial system for the sake of the rest of the economy. Though, external 
supervisor cannot prevent institutions from failing. Furthermore, as facilitators of the risk 
management process supervisors and regulators must evaluate and enhance the statutory 
framework under which risk management is carried out by regulated and supervised MFIs.  
 
One of the tools to regulate MFIs is the threat and use of penalties. Guidelines, requirements 
and regulations are easier to implement with a rather painful consequence for nonconformity 
or non-compliance. Logically, it is impossible for the regulating governance to stay up-to-
date about the existence of an entity, especially if reports are not being submitted.  
The two main principles of disobedience are fining consequences appropriate to the degree of 
non-compliance, and the standardization of basic penalties and sanctions for institutions. 
Degrees of penalties for financial institutions imposed by the supervising bank could be 
changed and adjusted to the seriousness and recurrence of the interference of the regulating 
authority. Cooperative societies have to follow strict guidelines and rules implemented by a 
board or commissioner.   
Incorporated NGO MFIs should have the same regulations to follow, than registered 
organizations, and should transmit financial statements and reports of operation to a 
registration agency, preferably audited externally to ensure a equal standard of supervision. 
Unfortunately, regulating agencies have scare resources of staff and time to execute, control 
and process these submissions, already with registered institutions, that it is a bigger 
challenge to the same with incorporated NGO MFIs. Even the smallest requirements, 
standard or individual, have to be controlled and in the event of non-conformity, be 
penalized. 
Difficulties in operating at acceptable standards carries the risk of not being able to comply 
with them and some institutions make the choice of terminating its operations instead of 
adjusting the guidelines to the standards required. Reworking, cancelling or suspending a 
MFI’s basis needs the consideration of the format and nature of the guidelines. A granted 
license for microfinance activities is the core of such standards. 
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The appropriate procedure to execute a mandatory suspension of operations and the 
definition of operating standards and performance should be addressed prior to the existence 
or termination of an MFI.63 
 
6.3 Requirements of a Regulation 
 
6.3.1 External Requirements  
The course and success of the transformation of a microfinance institution is strongly 
dependent of the external conditions in its environment. The levels with the highest influence 
on the process would be the political, economic, and legal and the position of the financial 
and banking sector discussed further on.  
 
6.1.3.1 Information and Incentive Problems in Financial Markets  
To begin with, the normative theory of regulation should be considered, based on the ideal of 
perfect and complete markets, to be able to highlight the specifics of the financial markets. 
Any regulation comes along with high costs. On the one hand, internal costs emerge while 
the microfinance institution is trying to meet the regulatory requirements. On the other hand, 
the costs on a macroeconomic level due to the restriction of competition and efficiency losses 
coming along with the regulation. In perfect and complete markets, regulatory interventions 
could not be justified. The question is what makes the financial markets not perfect, 
especially in developing countries. One main reason would be the asymmetric distribution of 
information between capital seeker and investors.  
6.1.3.2 Political and Economic Environment 
  
The macroeconomic and political environment can make the microfinance business very 
difficult if it is not stable and secure. If the risk of unexpected changes concerning the bank 
regulation is high, investors loose confidence in the system, which complicates the access to 
commercial capital. Macroeconomic factors such as unemployment rate, currency stability 
and inflation affect regulated MFIs much more than NGO, as investors expect certain 
justification concerning the bottom line.64                                                         63 See Van Greuning (1998), p. 17‐18 64 See Campion and White (1999), p.19 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6.1.3.3 Legal Environment  
If a MFI decides to become a regulated institution, the legal environment needs to provide 
the existence of an adequate legal form. Furthermore, to win investors confidence, norms 
must assure the legal enforceability of contracts. The greatest challenges would be though, to 
find the balance between minimum interference guaranteeing efficiency and competitiveness 
of the institution and needed supervision to control risks and corruption.65  
6.1.3.4 Financial and Banking Sector 
 
The financial and banking sector should consider the following aspects if they want to 
provide an attractive and interesting market to microfinance institutions.  
 
• Role of governmental banks: governmental banks can play important roles in case of 
market failure when they for example provide financial services to the poor population.66 
However, providing subsidized loans can lead to market distortion and can therefore 
hinder the entry of commercial financial institutions usually unwilling to compete with 
them.67  
 
• Limits of interest rates: Upper limits concerning interest rates are often assigned to protect 
poor people from to high rates.68 But especially in microfinance business they need to be 
higher than conventional credits, as they must be able to cover the above-average costs of 
transaction and administration. If this is not considered, MFI will have to pull themselves 
out of this market.  
 
• Minimum reserve and capital requirements: The more minimum reserve institutions have 
to deposit at the central bank, the less they have at disposal to accommodate loans. 
Minimum capital requirements can be expressed as a percentage or as an absolute value. 
Former, called capital adequacy ratios, indicate the required equity in relation to their risk 
weighted assets and should not be inferior to 8 percent according to Basel II. Latter could 
adversely affect and be an obstacle to smaller regulated institutions, as they have an 
inferior capacity than larger MFIs. 69                                                          65 See Campion and White (1999), p.19 66 See Lapenu (2000), p.33 67 See Loubière et al. (2004), p.6 68 See Loubière et al. (2004), p.7 69 McGuire et al. (1998) 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6.3.2 Internal Requirements 
 
Alongside the significant external factors influencing the transformation to a regulated 
institution, internal requirements such as economical sustainability, operating efficiency and 
the ability to charge high interest rate to cover the costs need to be fulfilled as well.  
6.2.3.5 Economical Sustainability   
If a MFI is economical sustainable, Kabeer, means that it generates enough sources of capital 
to be able to cover all costs. This is independent of the level of interest rates, financial 
charges, administrative costs, loan defaults, the composition of the portfolio and the 
inflation.70 
 
6.2.3.6 Operating Efficiency 
 
The share of operating and administrative expenses in the total lending portfolio is significant 
for self-preservation of the MFI. This share reflects the operating efficiency of this institution 
and is influenced by the following three factors: 
 
• Average salary of employees 
• Average loan per borrower and 
• Number of clients per employee 
 
One factor can compensate or abolish another, as for instance by recompensing higher 
transaction costs with lower salaries.71 
6.2.3.7 Use of Adequate Interest Rates 
  
Interest rates are the main source of income for MFIs. They can be up to 36% per annum or 
above. Considering the high number of borrowers, each with a very low amount of credit, the 
level of the interest rate is justified.72   
 
Depending on the extent to which the external and internal requirements have been fulfilled, 
the transformation from an NGO to a regulated microfinance institution can take place. As                                                         70 See Kabeer (2006), p.1 71 See Christen (2000), p.42 72 See Latifee (2005), p.27 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shown in this chapter, external factors are as important as internal, organisational factors 
during this process. This is on the other hand the qualification to attract commercial capital. 
The higher the degree of regulation of the MFI, the more opportunities it has to have access 
to capital on the market. 
 
 
7 Chances and Challenges of the Transformation of MFIs 
 
 
 
In order to analyse chances and challenges of the transformation of MFI, we first need to 
look at different aspect of transformation. This chapter focuses on target setting and 
background information why MFIs change. These targets lay out the developments of such a 
transformation.  
 
Over the past years, the financial system approach became more popular within the 
microfinance sector. This approach describes the application of market guidelines in the 
sense of economic principles of providing financial services to the poor to formal financial 
institutions. On one side there is the focus of profitability for each level of the individual 
MFI. And on the other side there is the liberalisation or relaxation of restrictions in financial 
markets.  
 
7.1  Chances and Targets of Transformation 
 
 
From a microfinance institutions point of view, three main reasons why to transform can be 
defined: 
 
• To offer more products and services to their clients 
• To gain access to capital (debt and equity) 
• To expand their outreach. 
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7.1.1 Provision of Savings Services and Other Products 
 
Some people share the opinion that enabling access to saving services to build assets is the 
better way to reduce poverty than giving them access to credits and consequently accumulate 
debt. Taking deposits also brings chances such as having the capacity to increase the number 
of clients, improving customer satisfaction and retention, improving loan repayment, 
stabilizing sources of funds and, last but not least, improving governance of the institution. 
Though in most of the country, taking deposits is only permitted to regulated institutions. In 
fact, other appreciated services such as specialized housing loans, money transfer or 
microinsurance may also be prohibited to provide before becoming a licensed MFI.73 
To fund loans by mobilizing savings from the public is not easy. The question is if it is worth 
all the trouble. Ledgerwood state that commercial microfinance does make a big difference 
and that it virtually benefits everyone involved: 
 
• MFIs clients benefit in different ways, as they are helped expending their enterprise, 
reducing their risks, to store their excess liquidity safely and obtain returns on their 
savings. Their options and self-confidence can be increased.  
• MFIs providing commercial microfinance services are able to increase efficiency and 
profitability and become viable for the long term. 
• Governments no longer do not need to offer subsidized loans or to cover the losses of 
subsidized credit programs. 
• Economies benefit from the augmented production, the positive macroeconomic impact of 
microfinance and the new resources made available for investments. 
• Societies benefit from the establishment of an inclusive financial sector, which creates an 
enabling environment for the growth of social and political participation.74  
 
7.1.2 Access to Capital 
 
MFI being NGOs are strongly dependent on donors funding. Given the actual tendency of 
unwillingness of donors to permanently fund the growing needs of capital loans and the 
institution’s limitation in debt they can access, MFIs face continual challenges concerning the 
desired long-term sustainability. The ability of funding is elementary for a MFI to grow as 
                                                        73 See Ledgerwood(2006), p. xxx 74 See Ledgerwood (2006), p. 17.18 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they meet continual demands for credits by new and existing clients and can therefore be the 
number one constraint to growth.  
According to CGAP, the worldwide portfolio of microfinance institutions in 2006 was 
U.S.$15 billion. When considering the speculation that the business of microfinance is 
growing between 15 and 30 percent, translating into a demand of between U.S.$2.4 and 
U.S.$5 billion for portfolio capital and requiring between U.S.$300 and U.S.$400 million in 
additional equity each year and considering that non-commercial investors (including donors, 
bilateral and multilateral financial institutions) pay out approximately U.S.$400 million 
annually to the sector, it is obvious that they can not reach the level of capital required to 
fully meet the demand, since part of the capital is needed for regulatory changes, information 
services, sector associations and other sector development initiatives.  
 
Taking deposits is not only an additional services for the clients, but also a possibility to fund 
larger volumes of credits and access a stable and potentially cheaper local source of funds. 
Thus accessing clients deposits also means accessing capital, alongside to commercial and 
concessional debt and equity sources.75  
 
It reduces the risk of capital shortage, which is considered to be the main adversary of 
growth. In the start-up phase, money provided by donors is usually sufficient, while quick 
and comprehensive access to capital is required during the phase of constant and sustainable 
growth. Due to the special characteristics of MFIs, a temporary shortage of funding can lead 
to a ruin of the MFI. Even a rumour of a capital shortage can cause a lot of damage, as clients 
will stop paying the loan repayment rate to hedge against eventual future illiquidity. 
Regulated Microfinance Institutions have easier access to cash, through other financial 
institutions or through the discount window of the Central Bank and can therefore reduce the 
risk of an institutional crisis caused by a shortage of liquid funds.  
 
The transformation of an NGO into a regulated deposit-taking MFI permit the institution to 
increase and diversify their capital funding source. Capital includes deposits, borrowing, 
subordinated debt, bonds, private equity and retained earnings. The creation of a 
shareholding company, which is usually implied while transformation, opens two more 
important sources of capital: private and public equity. The equity base is converted from one 
founded by donation to one composed of share capital, retained earnings, and sometimes                                                         75 See Ledgerwood (2006), p. xxx 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subordinated debt. The following table shows the evolution of funding sources while the MFI 
is maturing beginning as a start-up NGO and ending as matured transformed MFI.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Evolution of Funding Sources for Maturing MFIs76 
 
According to the MicroBanking Bulletin the average leverage ratios among NGOs is 2,2:1 
compared to 10:1 among banks. When leverage increases, it correlates positively with the 
portfolio size that can again permit an MFI to progress its return on equity, thus providing the 
capability to attract additional equity capital.77 
 
7.1.3 Increased Outreach 
 
Considering the initial and primary mission of MFIs to reduce poverty, as much poor people 
as possible need to be reached. By offering new products and services and having access to 
enough capital, institutions can growth as in the volume of credits lent and geographical 
extension. Market share and outreach can also increase due to the better competition 
compared to unregulated MFIs, as they are not forced to operate efficiently in order to satisfy 
stakeholder such as investors, shareholders and regulators.78  
 
                                                         76 See Ledgerwood (2006), p.165 77 See Ledgerwood (2006), p.165 78 See Ledgerwood (2006), p. xxxi 
  32 
7.2 Challenges of Regulation    
In the last two decades, microfinance has been improving constantly. To reach its goal of 
satisfying the massive worldwide demand and eliminate poverty, several challenges have to 
be overcome and will be discussed further on:  
 
1. Inappropriate donor subsidies 
2. Poor regulation and supervision of deposit-taking MFIs 
3. Few MFIs that mobilize savings 
4. Limited management capacity in MFIs 
5. Institutional inefficiencies 
6. Need for more dissemination and adoption of rural, agricultural microfinance 
methodologies79 
  
7.2.1 Inappropriate Donor Subsidies 
 
A great obstacle of regulation is the continued subsidization of the microfinance industry by 
donors. It is not clear anymore in what extend donors are discouraging natural market 
mechanisms. Microfinance are not motivated to pursue more commercial sources of capital 
such as mobilizing savings and commercial debt and equity funding and stay dependent on 
donors. The Grameen Bank for example reports U.S.$16.4 million in direct grants and 
U.S.$126.5 million of implicit subsidies in 1998. Campion declare that this focus on donor 
support has kept the Bank from implementing loan technologies that would lower operational 
costs and make savings rates more attractive to clients.  
 
7.2.2 Poor Regulation and Supervision 
 
To provide an effective regulation of microfinance institutions, it is not only dependent of the 
MFI itself, but also very much of the capacity of the regulatory authorities. Especially in poor 
countries, where microfinance is needed the most, authorities are not able to provide the 
capacity required to regulate and supervise institutions. Further, it is a bigger problem for 
MFIs, as there need a more oversight than others when mobilizing deposits. The regulator 
                                                        79 See Campion (2002), p.57‐63 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must know and understand the differences between MFIs and conventional institutions such 
as follows: 
 
• Lower capital requirements: it is difficult to define a minimum capital requirement as it must 
one the one hand be high enough to guarantee the creation of a solid institution and on the 
other hand low enough to make the market attractive for new MFIs.  
• Other level of interest rates: Regulator must accept the fact that MFIs have to charge much 
higher interest rates than traditional institutions in order to be able to cover the much higher 
transaction costs associated with offering microfinance.  
• Risk weighting: regulators should be aware of the different risk evaluation needed for 
microfinance. Judgement should not be based on traditional guarantees, as they are mostly 
missing in microfinance, but on the repayment history and the overall portfolio quality.  
• Stricter Provisioning: As portfolios tend to have shorter average maturities in microfinance, 
they require more aggressive provisioning.  
• Higher operating costs: managing small amounts of loans and deposits, operational costs 
have a tendency to be higher than at conventional institutions. Regulators should allow it if 
they can demonstrate a reasonable average return on assets.  
• Customized reporting: authorities must consider that MFI are mostly not capable to produce 
the same amount of documentation as traditional banks are. 
 
7.2.3 Few MFIs Mobilize Savings  
The majority of microfinance institutions are NGOs and therefore usually not allowed to take 
deposits. The whole microfinance sector should learn more about mobilizing savings and its 
benefits. A very good example would be the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) that managed to 
drastically grow as a result of its strong commitment to savings mobilization. Its 
microfinance division were cross-subsidizing the commercial loan division for years and 
could help the institution stay stable during the recent economic crisis in Indonesia.  
 
7.2.4 Limited Management Capacity 
 
When starting as an NGO, an important challenge is to build the management capacity to 
efficiently manage a commercial financial institution. Following areas need to be considered: 
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• Risk management: the board and senior management levels need to be prepared for the 
additional risks they will have to deal with coming with savings mobilization such as 
liquidity risk, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, fiduciary risk and more management risks.  
• Management information and internal control: the MFIs needs to make sure the management 
and internal control systems are reactive to the changing MFIs profile in terms of risk and the 
needs for information to monitor and control these risks.  
• Marketing and customer responsiveness: MFIs need to understand and respond to customers 
diverse needs and services preferences to better deal with the growing competition in the 
microfinance market and to satisfy the demand.  
• Human resource development: Institutions need to develop attractive human resource 
policies and incentive systems to retain good employees in a cost-effective manner to avoid 
loosing them to the competition.  
 
7.2.5 Institutional Inefficiencies 
 
MFIs work hard to improve and reduce operating costs and already found new methods and 
technologies to increase productivity and efficiency and to lower costs. But when the 
industry in general wants to be able to attract a substantial amount of commercial capital, 
more MFI will have to lower operating costs further.  
 
7.2.6 Need for More Rural, Agricultural Microfinance Methodologies 
 
In densely populated areas microfinance had a high demand and was very successful in 
countries with large informal sectors, whereas donor-supported agricultural lending programs 
were unsuccessful. Nowadays, rural finance models are being explored, addressing poverty 
in rural areas and making the rural finance market more attractive for other banks by showing 
achievements.  
 
To conclude, MFIs should take an eye on several challenges that have to that need to be 
addressed before the industry can achieve the goal of satisfying the worlds demand. 
Summarizing, donors should keep away from using direct subsidies that will lead to market 
distortion. Instead, they should help MFIs by improving regulatory and supervisory bodies by 
supporting the creation of credit bureaus, other information support systems and networks. 
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This was, the industry will get more interesting for more commercial capital and be better 
capable of meeting the demand and needs for microfinance. 80 
 
7.3 What Activities and Types of MFIs should be Regulated?   
An important question is which institutions should be regulated and which one not. 
Generally, regulation should be applied on institutions taking deposits and not be applied on 
institutions only providing credits.  
The primary task of regulation, from a general view, is to protect the small, unsophisticated 
depositors. Further duties can be following: 
 
• Formation and operation of MFIs 
• Consumer protection 
• Fraud and financial crime prevention 
• Credit information services 
• Limitations of foreign ownerships management and sources of capital 
• Tax and accounting issues 
• Interest rate policies.81 
 
7.4 Framework of Regulation by Van Greuning   
Further benefit is definitely the highly improved governance structure leading to 
sustainability and thus permanent institutions.  
 
The following table identifies a framework for which type of MFI fund generating activities 
need mandatory external guidelines and to what extend.  
 
 
                                                        80 See Campion (2002), p.57‐63 81 See Ledgerwood (2006), p. xxix 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Table 6:  Regulatory Thresholds of Activities by Type of Microfinance Institution 
Source: Van Greuning (1998), p.11 
 
Van Greuning suggest that for MFIs of type 1 and 2, no mandatory external regulation is 
required. A certain self-regulation through market selection takes place, as donors, 
government agencies and commercial banks would not invest in MFIs of the type 1 or 2 
without the capability for a due diligence and make informed decisions about them.  
 
Types 3 to 7 must be treated like any other social organization and business and should apply 
to a standard registration requirement covering documents of establishment and governance 
structure. Existing guidelines for prudential regulation can be adapted to MFIs, there is 
therefore no need to establish to design and implement an extra structure of regulatory 
standards and procedures.  
 
Referring to Van Greuning, banking laws should only cover voluntary deposits and not 
forced savings or mandatory deposits schemes that are specifically coupled with loan 
contracts. Banking laws normally govern the mobilization of deposits from the public, but 
can also cover the mobilization of other types of resources to accommodate the financing and 
investing needs other sectors my have, generally by means of non-deposit financial securities 
and instruments.  
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Banks and other conventional regulated institutions in the formal sector mobilize non-deposit 
funds through capital market activities such as wholesale deposits, commercial paper issues 
and securitization. Van Greuning suggests that MFIs, respecting the same standard 
requirements as for other institutions to do so, should have the similar but restricted options 
to mobilize non-deposits funds too. A market-based regulatory role can be played by external 
independent rating agencies, already performing in various countries, where institutions have 
access to capital market.  
 
Non-governmental MFIs mobilizing funds through wholesale deposits, as in type 3, need to 
satisfy securities registration requirements of the securities and exchange agency. When 
issuing wholesale-type financial instruments such as commercial paper securities and 
investment participation certificates, they will have to satisfy additional minimum 
requirements with respect to their financial standing and ability to service the placement or 
investment.  
Other regulatory thresholds according to Van Greuning are that MFIs of the type 2, 3 and 4 
with limited deposit taking in the form of forced or mandatory deposits which are tied to loan 
contracts should not need a specific license, but should only be authorized under an 
exemption or exclusion notice under the general banking law. This approach serves to unify 
regulatory jurisdiction over financial matters in the central monetary authority.   
 
Deposit taking by open-common bond savings and credit cooperatives or credit unions of 
type 4 in the table could be riskier and require closer attention, comparing them to closed-
common band societies. Latter limits membership to a clearly defined group of persons and 
have in general a limited scale of operations in terms of geography and size of membership 
base. The former chooses their members more on a geographical base rather than a 
specifically defined group. They tend to have a larger deposits volume and usually have a 
wider scope of operations.  
Type 5 MFIs are non-bank intermediaries, financing companies or specialized or limited 
banks. Their limited license enables them to practice deposit-taking activities from the public 
to an amount limited to a multiple of its total qualifying capital and excluding the ability to 
create demand deposits, with operations limited to a defined area. Deposits should be secured 
by liquidity reserves as in predetermined levels of deposits with the banking system or 
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investments in government securities. Through this limited options, the MFI gains important 
experience in managing liquidity risks and deposit mobilization programs.  
The last two types 6 and 7 are mutual-ownership or equity-share banks. They require special 
licenses and are subject to complete regulation and supervision by the regulatory and 
supervision by the regulatory authorities. 82 
 
8 Results to Date 
 
 
8.1 Evaluation of the Success of Transformation   
Taking a look at transformations of MFIs during the last two decades and their position 
nowadays, it is clear if they could attend the goals they were hoping to attend with the 
transformation in a regulated institution or not. Ledgerwood illustrates in her book 
“Transforming Microfinance Institutions” (2006) the results to date, summarized considering 
the three main goals discussed before.  
8.1.1 Provision of Savings Services 
 
The reason to transform bringing the most benefits with it is to getting the license to take 
deposits from the public. Together, MFIs providing saving services served over 35 million 
clients in December 2004.   
                                                        82  See Van Greuning (1998), p. 12‐13 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Table 7: Deposit-Taking Members of the Microfinance Network, dec. 2004 
Source: Ledgerwood (2006), p.xxxiii from MIXMarket 
 
8.1.2 Access to Capital  
It is not possible to hide or deny the fact that the transformation brings easier access to 
capital. If this fact helped the institutions being successful depends on what they see as 
success. “Estimates vary, but the bulk of the worldwide microfinance portfolio is currently 
funded by deposits (25 to 30 percent), dept (35 to 40 percent) and equity (30 to 40 
percent)”83. 
 
Concerning the MFIs in table 6, the majority state that even when the number of depositors 
exceeds the number of borrowers, they still could not always meet the needed funding of the 
regulated institution if the mobilization of savings would be the only source of capital. Some 
MFI have difficulties to mobilize enough deposits to meet the capital needs. The Mongolian 
XacBank prefers to be less dependent on large institutional deposits and have more smaller, 
cheaper current account savers instead. Interesting is that a sample of 67 MIX Market-listed 
MFIs with at least three years experience with deposit-taking have proven that there is no 
strict correlation between a relatively small average deposit and a low volume of savings, no 
matter the size or geographical position of the institution84. Small deposits can be an effective                                                         83 See de Sousa‐Shields (2004), p. xiv 84 See Ledgerwood (2006), p.xxxiv 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and significant source of portfolio funding “if a small number of large deposits cross-
subsidize the administrative costs of many small savers”85. 
 
Illustrated by the following table, regulated MFIs have a much higher ability to leverage their 
funding, as equity funding is only 10 to 20 percent for most of the MFIs involved, rather than 
the estimated 35 to 40 by de Sousa-Shields.  
 
Table 8:  Funding Structures of Regulated Deposit-Taking Institutions (in percent), 12/200486 
Source: Ledgerwood (2006), p.xxxiii 
 
Investors of regulated microfinance institutions are mostly social or non-commercial. Latter 
rather invest in regulated institutions than NGOs. According to de Sousa-Shields, 
investments from publicly owned international funds are 88 percent concentrated in regulated 
MFIs.87  
Private investments only represent a small percentage in microfinance funding. This results 
on the one hand from the lack of transparency and quality information about social and 
financial performance of the MFI, and on the other hand from the lack of understanding 
concerning the business microfinance. Many potential investors don’t understand for 
example why MFIs so high interest rates. Not knowing that they have to cover the high 
operating expenses compared to the loan sizes and that the alternative financial source for the                                                         85 See de Sousa‐Shields (2004), p.38 86 See Ledgerwood (2006), p. xxxiii 87 See de Sousa‐Shields (2004), p. ix 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poor, the moneylenders, even charge more. Other obstacles making private investments 
hesitate from investing in MFIs are inadequate risk/return profiles, a lack of information 
about countries and their financial markets and a lack of sufficient foreign exchange hedging 
instruments.  
 
8.1.3 Increased Outreach 
 
 
 
Table 9: Transformation Results: Outreach 
Source: Ledgerwood (2006), p. xxxvi 
 
As is apparent from the table above, all licensed, deposit-taking institutions have experienced 
a fabulous increase in number of borrowers, deposits accounts and in the portfolio volume of 
outstanding loans.  
For the institutions to be able to grow is definitely the owing to the wider range of products 
and services offered. The Banco Los Andes ProCredit offers nowadays micro and small 
enterprise loans, consumer loans, housing loans, agriculture livestock loans, saving accounts, 
time deposit accounts, guarantee slips, national and international money transfer, and 
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national tax and public services collection. Before the transformation it was an NGO, only 
able to provide micro and small enterprise loans and gold pawn loans.  
The XacBank went from only offering two loan products to offering 17 different loan 
products and seven savings products.88 
 
To conclude one can confirm that MFIs have indeed been able to access a significantly 
broader range of financing sources, thus greatly improving their ability to rapidly scale up 
operations by growing, deepening and leveraging their equity bases.89  
 
Given the numerous benefits coming along with a transformation, comparatively only a very 
low percentage of MFIs operate as RFIs. This is referable to the non-favourable environment 
for MFIs in some countries. If for example there is no adequate form of organization for RFI, 
the minimum capital and reserve requirements are prohibitively high, or strict interest rates 
restrictions prevail, the conditions block the transformation of MFI from the outset.  
 
8.2 Experience of MFIs with Regulation and Supervision 
 
We have now discussed what challenges and benefits come with a regulation. Thus it is 
based on very theoretical perspective and literature. As microfinance has become an 
important topic, a number of papers have advanced the thinking on the regulation and 
supervision of MFI over the years. Nowadays are enough examples to bring more practical 
dimension into the theory of regulation of MFIs.  
 
ACCIÓN international is a private, non-profit organization providing microcredits and 
technical assistance to those around the world who are under-serviced by local banks. Their 
mission is to give people access to the financial tools they need to work their way out of 
poverty.90 This organization has over 45 years of experience in the field of international 
economic development. ACCIÓN international conducted a survey with detailed interviews 
of seven MFIs from six different countries. See table below for more information about the 
institutions. These institutions, with the exception of Banco Solidario, underwent a 
                                                        88 See Ledgerwood (2006), p. xxxvi 89 See Ledgerwood (2006, p. xxxi 90 See Rhyne (2002), p.2 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transformation from NGO into a regulated institution. Three of them are commercial banks, 
while four are financieras.  
According to ACCIÓN international the purpose of this survey was to investigate the results 
of the regulation with the perceived costs, benefits and to examine what theory worked in 
practice and what did not work. Furthermore, this survey outlines recommendations on 
changes the practitioners would suggest to the content and implementation of supervision.  
 
 
Table 10: Institutions Involved in the Survey 
Source: Rhyne (2002) 
 
This survey has shown that all institutions involved are overwhelmingly pleased to be 
regulated and would never consider to revert to their NGO form. Even when transformation 
does not always flow smoothly, the fundamental benefits as listed subsequently outweigh the 
cost and efforts related. CGAP roughly estimates that the costs of supervision are equal to 5 
percent of total costs during the first year and remains 1 percent thereafter.  
The achieved benefits of the transformation are following: 
 
1. Much easier access to sources of funds for equity and debt, especially commercial sources 
2. Increase in geographical and quantitative growth: serve more people in more areas 
3. Improvement in quality of operations through the higher standards of control and reporting 
4. Superior legitimacy and recognition in the financial sector.91 
 
                                                        91 See Rhyne (2002), p. 3 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One general inconvenient to mention experienced by the institutions involved with this 
survey is the restrictive freedom to try unconventional ideas of new products or markets that 
have not proved their viability. To keep the microfinance sector dynamic and as innovative as 
it has to be to improve within the fight against poverty, the importance of institutions 
remaining NGOs as seedbeds for experimentation is not to underestimate. 
 
8.2.1 Lack of Understanding 
 
According to the institutions, the origin of the problems occurring while and after regulation 
is the lack of understanding by the regulating authorities of the unique characteristics of 
microfinance. This lack of understanding and the comparison with conventional banks let 
supervisors consider microfinance as a very risky sector. The result is that their try to adapt 
microfinance to conventional banks, rather than suit policies to the specialities of 
microfinance. Rhyne names two groups of people whose deep understanding is essential: 
policymakers involved in design of regulatory frameworks and norms and supervisors 
responsible for on- and off-site oversight of MFIs. To solve this problem, the staff of 
regulatory agencies should undergo a special training on microfinance92.  
 
8.2.2 Observations from the Licensing Process  
The whole licensing process is quite difficult as on the long time frame of two years or more 
and is considered to be the most challenging part of being regulated. The changes made in 
this period such as internal control, reporting capabilities, branch physical security etc. are 
commented to be very beneficial on the long run.  
Different from what one might assume, meeting minimum capital requirements was not a big 
deal, once the institutional form has been chosen. And further, because the compulsory 
capital was, for most of the institutions, as high as the amount of capital needed to achieve 
and maintain profitable operations or less.  
  
Alongside the length of the licensing process, another core problem is during that period is 
finding an ownership and management structure that is acceptable to both authorities and the 
MFI. Among this survey, authorities were unwilling to approve the following constellations 
of management and ownerships:                                                         92 See Rhyne (2002), p.4 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• In many cases it was considered inappropriate for the original NGO to own a major portion 
of a licensed institution 
• In Honduras it was a problem for foreign institutions such as donor-related ones and 
international MFIs to be owners 
• Individuals in senior management positions having expertise in microfinance but not in 
conventional banking 
 
Microfinance is a sector where flexibility is required, also concerning its management. So 
even when owners or managers do not fit standard expectations at the first run, the do 
compensate with factors such as specialized knowledge, deep long-term commitment or 
reputation risk.93  
 
8.2.3 Regulation and Supervision of Microloan Portfolios 
 
What the best practice is for conventional banking is not necessarily the best way for MFIs. 
An important challenge of regulation for microfinance is to define its own norms rather than 
trying to adapt this sector to the norms of conventional banking. The following listing is 
some areas where the involved MFIs said their best practices conflicted with standard 
banking regulations: 
 
• The risks classification: through the characteristics of microfinance, microcredits are placed 
in unsecured categories, due to the non-recognition of standard forms of collateral used in 
microfinance, such as group lending or non-standard collateral. 
• Loan documentation requirements unsuitable for informal business – without actually 
improving the safety of the portfolio. In fact, both, BancoSol and Mibanco experienced 
resentment from clients regarding increased loan documentation requirements after they 
became commercial. Existing clients viewed the demand for such documentation as evidence 
the lenders no longer trusted them. 
• Putting microcredits in the same group as consumer lending. These two kinds of lending are 
based on completely different lending methods and repayment comes from a different source 
(salary versus self-employment). Each type of lending must have its own norms. 
                                                        93 See Rhyne (2002), p.4 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• Ineffective techniques of supervising the portfolio: regulators spend too much time looking at 
individual loan folders, rather than putting the focus on the quality, timeliness and reliability 
of MFI and inspecting portfolio quality control systems in general.94 
 
8.3 Areas where Microfinance May Need Special Norms 
 
 
Rhyne uses the rating methodology CAMEL ACCIÓN to summarize the need for rigorous 
regulatory norms that are adequately tailored to microfinance. The CAMEL technique, 
originally adopted by North American bank regulators, reviews and rates five areas of 
financial and managerial performance: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings 
and liquidity management. Based on this framework, ACCION International developed its 
own instrument reflecting it’s the unique challenges and conditions facing the special sector 
of microfinance.  
 
The following table show the 21 key indicators classifier in the five main areas and how the 
differ from the standard banking. It shows areas where microfinance differs from 
conventional banking norms and would therefore need a special focus.  
 
 
                                                        94 See Rhyne (2003), p. 5‐6 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Table 11: ACCION CAMEL Key Indicator95 
Source: Rhyne (2002), p.5­6 
 
From this survey one can conclude that regulation of microfinance institutions is a growing 
tendency nowadays bringing challenges for the single institutions but also strong benefits for 
them and therefore for the whole sector. The flexibility to try new products or markets is 
restricted to a certain extend due to the regulation, so one must underline the importance of 
MFIs remaining NGO, having more freedom to act as seedbeds for experimentation.96 
 
 
                                                        95 See Rhyne (2002), p.5‐6 96 See Rhyne (2002), p.7 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8.4 Rating for Microfinance   
 
MFIs face the challenge to convince potential donors and investors of the profitability of 
their activities. It can be difficult for them believing in microfinance when used to the 
transparent, conventional banking. Independent agencies can be hired for evaluation and 
assessments, but they are mostly expensive and lack a common standard that can be applied 
to the entire industry.97  
 
As already discussed, private investors hesitate from investing in microfinance institutions 
due to a lack of transparency about social and financial performance. Looking forward, it will 
be a key challenge for microfinance to grow to increase the attractiveness of this business and 
the ability of diversified funding, especially private capital. Stakeholders, such as regulators, 
have identified this chance and are responding to the need of transparency and quality 
reporting98.  
 
What microfinance needs is an independent credit rating system respecting the specialities of 
the field and sending a clear, traceable and creditable opinion about sustainability of MFIs 
and their activities to donors and investors. Ratings will increasingly get very important in 
the business of microfinance. Evaluations of agencies can raise the quality and efficiency of 
MFIs and provide trust and security for private investors. Regulators are able to see ratings 
and standards as a way to separate well from bad performing institutions. Furthermore, 
donors are interested in setting performance standards to provide clear benchmarks and 
guidelines to determine eventual future funds for MFIs. Performance standards can be useful 
in promoting independent and transparent review of MFIs, which should enhance prospects 
for the growth in the next step.99 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        97 See Srinivas (2009) 98 See Ledgerwood (2006), p. xxxv 99 See Srinivas (2009) 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9 Critics 
 
 
We have now focused on the challenges and benefits from the point of view of the institution 
itself and the regulators and supervisor. Even if it is evident that MFIs can better meet clients 
demand when regulating, many people fear that the regulation will inevitably lead to a 
shifting of priorities, meaning that profit maximization becomes more important than the 
initial, social mission microfinance has its origin from. This critic is named as mission drift.  
Mission drift would occur when institutions will offer larger loans to higher income people, 
as they must meet demands for higher returns from shareholders. The microfinance services 
would not meet the needs of the very poor anymore.  
 
From an economic point of view, it is much more efficient to give one single loan in the 
amount of U.S.$100,000 than giving 1,000 loans in the amount of U.S.$100 due to the 
administrative and transaction costs. This fact gives MFIs inducement to aim for higher 
credits. Thus with the allocation of higher credits MFIs will address people with higher 
incomes, which is when mission drift occurred. 100 
 
Looking at the following table, evidence show that regulated MFIs do provide larger loans 
than unregulated ones. In fact, referring to the numbers in the table below, the ratio is one to 
three.   
 
Table 12: Average outstanding loan balances for regulated and unregulated MFIS in Latin America, 1999 
Source: Christen (2000), p.32                                                         100 See Woller (2002), p.14 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But the question is, do larger loans automatically lead to mission drift? In the paper 
“Commercialization and Mission Drift” the author Robert Peck Christen explains other 
factors that could lead to larger loans than mission drift with the focus on Latin America.  
 
They could just be the result of a deliberate strategy or choice on the part of MFIs. More 
established and older MFIs in Latin America did not have the initial mission to reach the 
poorest, but to promote small enterprise development to generate new jobs. There was no 
mission drift in the case of the first generation of MFIs transformed into regulated 
institutions.  
 
In strong contrast is the approach taken by most of the new MFIs. Robert Peck Christen 
divides them into two subgroups:  
 
• Poverty oriented NGOs 
• Commercial banks  
 
The new generation of NGOs are mostly unregulated. They seek from the outset to encourage 
very poor women and bring them into productive activities. Their target clients are much 
poorer than the clientele of the first generation. Thus, the large difference between the 
average loan of unregulated and commercial MFIs may simply reflects the fact that the two 
groups focused on different populations. In the case of unregulated NGO, mission drift has 
not occurred at all.  
 
Commercial banks are always seeking to achieve high returns. An interesting observed 
tendency in Latin America is that banks are entering the microfinance markets at or nearly 
the same level as the pioneering NGOs that preceded them. Banks tend to copy closely the 
methods that have been proven to be successful in their immediate environment. Reaching 
the very poorest can indeed be very lucrative. One has to keep in mind though that they do 
not have a social mission that pushes them far down the socioeconomic ladder, but they do 
recognize a profitable opportunity, regardless of the client group.  
 
Another factor may be the natural evolution of the average loan balances of NGOs that 
transformed themselves into regulated MFIs. But the question is, did their loan balances 
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increase in a way that suggests that the profitability drove the terms and conditions of loans 
and thus the selection of their target market?  
Christen answers the question based on the data for 19990 to 1999 from programs supported 
by two of the most major microfinance supporter in Latin America Acción International and 
International Project Consult (IPC). Their programs were mostly young in 1990 and thus 
dominated by new borrower. The following factors could have lead increase the average loan 
size: 
 
• These programs engage in incremental lending in which loan balances start well below the 
client’s ability to pay the instalments and are subsequently increased through many short-
term loans 
• The microenterprises financed by these loans could be expected to have grown, as would 
their demand for credit.  
• The boarder economy in which MFIs act much be taken into account as a dynamic economy 
my benefit microenterprises for example, which in return may require larger loans.  
 
If the average loan size augments as a consequence of one of these factors this does not mean 
that the MFI has left its initial target group behind. The data demonstrates that the average 
did not increase beyond levels compatible with the natural evolution of their loan product and 
target group. Thus, in a typical MFI the average loan size can easily double or triple as both 
the program and its target group mature. 
 
MFIs such as Finamérica and BancoAdemi having both moved substantially up-market, have 
different reasons for that. Former was forced to move up-market in response of the 
insolvency of Corposol/Finansol, from which it was reborn. Latter increased the average loan 
size as a consequence of a long-term commitment to the upper end of microenterprises, 
mostly acting in the productive sector. Even in these cases mission drift cannot be 
observed.101 
 
 
 
 
                                                        101 See Christen (2000), p. 31‐48 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9.1 Case Study BancoSol  
9.1.1 History 
 
The story of Banco Solidario (short BancoSol) began 1986 with the foundation of the 
microfinance NGO PRODEM in Bolivia. Already in 1988 the MFI had grown so fast that 
they could not satisfy their capital needs anymore, as they were neither permitted to mobilize 
savings nor to have a high leverage being a NGO. They were very dependent on donations 
and subsidies. With the main aim to overcome the capital shortage BancoSol has been 
created in 1992 as first bank specialised in microfinance.102 Finally, PRODEM conferred a 
total of around U.S.$6,5 million, about 14,300 established clients, some city branches and 
some intangible assets on BancoSol. This included lending technology, information capital, 
contacts, human capital, a serious reputation and involvement in an existing international 
network.103   
 
9.1.2 Analysis of Mission Drift  
 
BancoSol tries on the one hand to go into the matter of their social mission helping the very 
poor to improve their future prospects. And on the other hand they try to operate as 
financially profitable as possible in order to obtain economical sustainability due to their 
bank status.  
It is now in connection with the above discussion whether the financial success due to the 
transformation has occurred at the expense of the social component.   
  
Gaamaa Hishigsuren provides in her article “Evaluating Mission Drift in Microfinance” a 
framework how to evaluate BancoSol. Hishigsuren proposes to evaluate the degree of 
mission drift through three factors and their changes before and after commercialization: 
 
• Depth of outreach: demographic statistics such as clients’ income levels, interest rates and 
loan sizes 
• Quality of outreach: levels of satisfaction with the products and services, often represented 
by the client-employee ratio 
• Scope of outreach: types of services offered.                                                          102 See ACCIÒN International (2007) 103 See Gonzalez‐Vega et al. (1996), p. 5 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The first factor is the augmentation of the average loan size from U.S.$326 in 1992 to 
U.S.$1,572 in 2006, which does raise suspicion.104 This would be an indication of the target 
clients to less poor people. But looking at the number of clients and the volume of the total 
loan portfolio, one can see that all factors increase after transformation. BancoSol took over 
14,300 clients from PRODEM. In 2005, the institution accommodate 17,345 loans under 
U.S.$500 which represents nearly 30% of the total quantity of credits but only nearly 4% of 
the total loan portfolio, documented in the table below. This indicates that BancoSol did not 
lent less to poor people, but additionally lent higher loans to less poorer people. As shown in 
the table below, loans higher than U.S.$10,000 only represent around 22% of the total loan 
portfolio and around 2.5% of the total quantity of loans.  
 
 
Table 13: Allocation of Loans According to their Sizes in the Total Portfolio (2009) 
Source: on the basis of BancoSol (2005) 
 
                                                        104 See The MIXMarket (2009) 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Another factor one should have a closer look at is the upper limit of loans that has increased 
in a way that brings up the question if these credits still fall in the category of microcredits. 
Sol individual has an upper limit of U.S.$30,000 and Sol Vivienda of U.S.$100,000.  
 
Gaamaa Hishigsuren comes to the conclusion that because of the higher upper limit, 
borrowers must be from a higher income level, which is a significant indication of mission 
drift.  
She abstract away from the fact that these higher loans only represent around 3.20% of the 
total quantity and that this only involves the addition of new markets, not subtraction from 
the initial social mission.   
It can be concluded that BancoSol did not increase the average loan size by having less poor 
clients and offering higher credits but by diversifying the portfolio and serving additionally 
new, less poor clients.  
A further factor to consider would be the interest rate. According to Hishigsuren, they turned 
out to be determinedly higher than before transformation, making credits less accessible to 
lower-income clients. They were also allowed to fluctuate with the market, which also 
excludes some clients when they rise. On the other hand, savings interest rates still remained 
accommodating to poor clients.  
 
The quality of outreach is determined by the ration of loan officers to clients. Although it 
increased significantly after regulation, the staffs of BancoSol are still on a par with NGOs, 
since they are specially trained for poverty alleviation. In this case, mission drift cannot be 
proven.  
 
The scope of outreach according to Hishigsuren is a clear indication of mission drift, as 
BancoSol is strictly limited to financial services, while PRODEM offered additionally 
nonfinancial services such as health and education.  
 
It must be mentioned that BancoSol has been established to allow stronger clients to grow 
with their microenterprise. The NGO PRODEM remained to concentrate on the poor 
population in rural areas. It was the ulterior motive of the transformation to grow to be able 
to support microenterprises.105  
                                                         105 See Barzelay (2008) 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Barzelay state that BancoSol did not disregard its social mission of alleviating poverty and 
providing loans to the poorest. The institution must now behave more as a real bank, which 
causes suspicion to mission drift. BancoSol must operate efficient to get high returns for the 
investors. But this does not mean that they do not focus on helping the poor anymore. 
BancoSol is a good example for pursuing the two goals that seem incompatible with and has 
no significant evidence to mission drift.106 
 
 
10 Conclusion 
 
 
 
The result of the evaluation lead to the conclusion that the transformation of PRODEM into 
BancoSol was successful on both levels: social and economical. The two objectives seem 
incompatible at first view, but the case of BancoSol shows that MFIs can reconcile them with 
another and achieve a satisfying outcome.  
This does not mean that this success story is applicable to all MFIs. While in a lot of countries 
MFIs must struggle with political and economic instability, repressive financial systems or 
lack of business knowledge, BancoSol were acting in a microfinance-supporting national 
environment with a well-developed urban infrastructure. Furthermore, some internal factors 
such as visionary founding members, a strong regular clientele, established contacts to 
potential investors and the integration into international networks also contributed to the 
success of the transformation.  
 
The case study of BancoSol illustrates moreover that indications of a mission drift such as 
increase of the average loan size can have different reasons and does not necessarily mean 
that mission drift has actually occurred. Only by having a closer examination, one can 
recognize that these indications are actually due to a positive development. In the case of 
BancoSol it was due to the growth of microenterprises and the banks’ diversification of the 
loan portfolio by additionally targeting less poorer groups. Further approach demonstrates that 
it may simply be the function of different factors such as choice of strategy period of entry 
into the market, or natural evolution of the target group.107  
                                                         106 See Barzelay (2008) 107 See Christen (2000) 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However, if the environmental conditions are not favourable to regulated microfinance 
institutions, NGO MFIs are much better off and can efficiently pursue their social mission to 
fight against poverty. Both forms of organization, the regulated and non-regulated, should 
coexist in a microfinance market, as they fulfil complementary tasks. An adequate separation 
of responsibilities for both forms seems to be a reasonable solution.  
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